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Abstract
We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a sub-
set of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates
are selected. Aziz et al. (2015) proposed two representation axioms called
justified representation and extended justified representation. Whereas the for-
mer can be tested as well as achieved in polynomial time, the latter property is
coNP-complete to test and no polynomial-time algorithm is known to achieve it.
Interestingly, Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (2016) proposed an intermediate prop-
erty called proportional justified representation that admits a polynomial-time
algorithm to achieve. The complexity of testing proportional justified represen-
tation has remained an open problem. In this paper, we settle the complexity
by proving that testing proportional justified representation is coNP-complete.
We complement the complexity result by showing that the problem admits effi-
cient algorithms if any of the following parameters are bounded: (1) number of
voters (2) number of candidates (3) maximum number of candidates approved
by a voter (4) maximum number of voters approving a given candidate.
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1. Introduction
We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a
subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target k number of candidates
are selected. The setting has been referred to as approval-based multiwinner
voting or committee voting with approvals. The setting has inspired a number
of natural voting rules [8, 5, 9, 3, 13]. Many of the voting rules attempt to
satisfy some notion of representation. However it has been far from clear what
axiom captures the representation requirements.
Aziz et al. [1, 2] proposed two compelling representation axioms called justi-
fied representation (JR) and extended justified representation (EJR). Whereas
the former can be tested as well as achieved in polynomial time, the latter prop-
erty is coNP-complete to test and no polynomial-time algorithm is known to
achieve it. Interestingly, Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [11] proposed an intermedi-
ate property called proportional justified representation (PJR) that admits a
polynomial-time algorithm to achieve [6, 12].1 The idea behind all the three
properties is that a cohesive and large enough group deserves sufficient number
of approved candidates in the winning set of candidates. Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez
et al. [11] argued that although EJR is a stronger property than PJR, PJR is
more reasonable because it is compatible with a property called perfect repre-
sentation.
Proportional justified representation (PJR) has been examined in subsequent
papers [6, 12, 10]. Despite the flurry of work on the property, the complexity
of testing proportional justified representation has remained an open problem.
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [10] state that “we do not know what is the complex-
ity of checking whether a given committee provides PJR”. In a talk “Approval
Voting, representation, & Liquid Democracy” at the Workshop on Future Di-
rections in Computational Social Choice, Hungary in November 2016, Markus
Brill also mentioned the problem as an interesting open problem. 2 The prob-
lem is especially important if one wants to test whether a status quo outcome
or the outcome of some other rule or negotiation process satisfies PJR. Pre-
viously, Aziz et al. [4] studied the complexity of testing Pareto optimality of a
committee.
In this paper, we settle the complexity of testing PJR by proving that the
problem is coNP-complete. We complement the complexity result by showing
that the problem admits efficient algorithms if any of the following parameters
are bounded: (1) n (number of voters) (2) m (number of candidates) (3) a
(maximum number of candidates approved by a voter) (4) d (maximum number
of voters approving a given candidate). For the first two parameters, we show
that the problem is FPT (fixed-parameter tractable), i.e, there exists an FPT
algorithm that solves the problem in f(k) · poly(|I|) time, where where k is the
1The property PJR was independently proposed by Haris Aziz in October 2014 who referred
to it as weak EJR.
2http://econ.core.hu/file/download//future_markus.pdf
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parameter and f is some computable function and poly is a polynomial both
independent of problem instance I.
Our results are summarized in Table 1.
Parameter Complexity Reference
— coNP-complete Th. 1
n: # voters in FPT: O(2nmn) Th. 2
m: # candidates in FPT: O(2mm3n) Th. 3
a : maxi∈N |Ai| in P for constant a: O(ma+1m2n) Th. 4
d : maxc∈C |{i ∈ N : c ∈ Ai}| in P for constant d: O(n
ddnm2) Th. 5
Table 1: Complexity of testing PJR
2. Approval-based Committee Voting and Representation Properties
We consider a social choice setting with a set N = {1, . . . , n} of voters and
a set C of m candidates. Each voter i ∈ N submits an approval ballot Ai ⊆ C,
which represents the subset of candidates that she approves of. We refer to the
list ~A = (A1, . . . , An) of approval ballots as the ballot profile. We will consider
approval-based multi-winner voting rules that take as input a tuple (N,C, ~A, k),
where k is a positive integer that satisfies k ≤ m, and return a subset W ⊆ C
of size k, which we call the winning set, or committee.
We now summarize the main representation properties proposed in the lit-
erature.
Definition 1 (Justified representation (JR)). Given a ballot profile ~A =
(A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C and a target committee size k, we say
that a set of candidates W of size |W | = k satisfies justified representation for
( ~A, k) if
∀X ⊆ N : |X | ≥
n
k
and | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ 1 =⇒ (|W ∩ (∪i∈XAi)| ≥ 1)
The rationale behind this definition is that if k candidates are to be selected,
then, intuitively, each group of n
k
voters “deserves” a representative. Therefore,
a set of n
k
voters that have at least one candidate in common should not be
completely unrepresented.
Definition 2 (Extended justified representation (EJR)). Given a ballot profile
(A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C, a target committee size k, k ≤ m, we say
that a set of candidates W , |W | = k, satisfies ℓ-extended justified representation
for ( ~A, k) and integer ℓ if
∀X ⊆ N : |X | ≥ ℓ
n
k
and | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ ℓ =⇒ (∃i ∈ X : |W ∩ Ai| ≥ ℓ).
We say that W satisfies extended justified representation for ( ~A, k) if it
satisfies satisfies ℓ-extended justified representation for ( ~A, k) and all integers
ℓ ≤ k.
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Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [11] came up with the notion of proportional justi-
fied representation (PJR), which can be seen as an alternative to EJR.
Definition 3 (Proportional Justified Representation (PJR)). Given a ballot
profile (A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C, a target committee size k, k ≤ m,
and integer ℓ we say that a set of candidates W , |W | = k, satisfies ℓ-proportional
justified representation for ( ~A, k) if
∀X ⊆ N : |X | ≥ ℓ
n
k
and | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ ℓ =⇒ (|W ∩ (∪i∈XAi)| ≥ ℓ)
We say that W satisfies proportional justified representation for ( ~A, k) if it
satisfies satisfies ℓ-proportional justified representation for ( ~A, k) and all integers
ℓ ≤ k.
It is easy to observe that EJR implies PJR which implies JR.
3. Results
We first prove that testing PJR is coNP-complete. The proof involves a
similar type of reduction as the one used by Aziz et al. [1, 2] to prove that
testing EJR is coNP-complete.
Theorem 1. Given a ballot profile ~A, a target committee size k, and a com-
mittee W , |W | = k, it is coNP-complete to check whether W satisfies PJR for
( ~A, k).
Proof. It is easy to see that this problem is in coNP. A set of voters X ⊂ N
such that |X | ≥ ℓn
k
, | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ ℓ and |W ∩ (∪i∈XAi)| ≥ ℓ) is a certificate that
W does not satisfy PJR.
To prove coNP-completeness, we reduce the classic Balanced Biclique
problem ([GT24] in Garey and Johnson 1979) to the complement of our prob-
lem. An instance of Balanced Biclique is given by a bipartite graph (L,R,E)
with parts L and R and edge set E, and an integer ℓ; it is a “yes”-instance if
we can pick subsets of vertices L′ ⊆ L and R′ ⊆ R so that |L′| = |R′| = ℓ and
(u, v) ∈ E for each u ∈ L′, v ∈ R′; otherwise, it is a “no”-instance.
Given an instance 〈(L,R,E), ℓ〉 of Balanced Biclique with R =
{v1, . . . , vs}, we create an instance of our problem as follows. Assume without
loss of generality that s ≥ 3, ℓ ≥ 3. We construct 3 pairwise disjoint sets of can-
didates C0, C1 and C2, so that C0 = L, |C1| = ℓ− 1, |C2| = sℓ+ ℓ− 3s+(ℓ− 2),
and set C = C0 ∪ C1 ∪ C2. We then construct 3 sets of voters N0, N1, N2,
so that N0 = {1, . . . , s}, |N1| = ℓ(s − 1) + ℓ, |N2| = sℓ + ℓ − 3s + (ℓ − 2)
(note that |N2| ≥ (ℓ − 1) as we assume that ℓ ≥ 3). For each i ∈ N0 we set
Ai = {uj | (uj , vi) ∈ E}, and for each i ∈ N1 we set Ai = C0 ∪ C1. The candi-
dates in C2 are matched to voters in N2: each voter in N2 approves exactly one
candidate in C2, and each candidate in C2 is approved by exactly one voter in
N2. Denote the resulting list of ballots by ~A. Finally, we set k = 2ℓ− 2, and let
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W = C1∪X , where X is a subset of C2 with |X | = ℓ−1. Note that the number
of voters n is given by s+ ℓ(s− 1) + ℓ+ sℓ+ ℓ− 3s+ (ℓ− 2) = 2(s+ 1)(ℓ− 1),
so n
k
= s+ 1.
Suppose first that we started with a “yes”-instance of Balanced Biclique,
and let (L′, R′) be the respective ℓ-by-ℓ biclique. Let C∗ = L′ and N∗ = R′∪N1.
Then |N∗| = ℓ(s + 1) = ℓn
k
, all voters in N∗ approve all candidates in C∗,
|C∗| = ℓ, but all voters in N∗ together are only represented by ℓ− 1 candidates
in W . Hence, W fails to provide ℓ-proportional justified representation for
( ~A, k).
Conversely, suppose that W fails to provide PJR for ( ~A, k). That is, there
exists a value j > 0, a set N∗ of j(s + 1) voters and a set C∗ of j candidates
so that all voters in N∗ approve of all candidates in C∗, but all voters in N∗
together are only represented by less than j candidates in W . Note that, since
s > 1 and j ≥ 1, we have N∗ ∩N2 = ∅. Further, since |N∗| = j(s + 1) ≥ s+ 1
and |N0| = s, it follows that N
∗ contains one voter from N1. So, all voters in
N∗ together are represented by exactly ℓ−1 candidates in W . This implies that
j ≥ ℓ. As N∗ = j(s + 1) ≥ ℓ(s + 1), it follows that |N∗ ∩ N0| ≥ ℓ. Since N∗
contains voters from both N0 and N1, it follows that C
∗ ⊆ C0. Thus, there are
at least ℓ voters in N∗ ∩N0 who approve the same j ≥ ℓ candidates in C0; any
set of ℓ such voters and ℓ such candidates corresponds to an ℓ-by-ℓ biclique in
the input graph.
Note that although there is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a com-
mittee that achieves PJR [6, 12], we have proved that checking whether any arbi-
trary committee achieves PJR is coNP-complete. We complement the negative
computational result by showing that testing PJR is computationally tractable
if one of the following parameters is bounded.
• m = |C|
• n = |N |
• a = maxi∈N |Ai| (maximum size of approval sets).
• d = maxc∈C |{i ∈ N : c ∈ Ai}| (maximum number of approvals of a
candidate).
We first observe that testing PJR is in FPT with parameter n.
Theorem 2. Testing PJR is in FPT with parameter n and takes time at most
O(2nmn).
Proof. Suppose we want to check whetherW ⊂ C satisfies PJR. If n is bounded
then one can simply brute force all the possible violating sets X ⊆ N of voters
and check that if |X | ≥ ℓn
k
and | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ ℓ then it must be that |W ∩
(∪i∈XAi)| ≥ ℓ.
Next, we prove that testing PJR is in FPT with parameter m.
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Theorem 3. Testing PJR is in FPT with parameter m and takes time at most
O(2mm3n).
Proof. Suppose we want to check whether W ⊂ C satisfies PJR. Note that it
is sufficient to show that testing ℓ-PJR is in FPT with parameter m. Note that
ℓ ≤ |X |k/n for all X ⊂ N . Since |X | ≤ n, ℓ ≤ k ≤ m.
We go through all the subsets S ∈ 2C of size ℓ. Each set S is viewed as the
intersection of possible objecting/deviating set of voters. For each S, we find
the corresponding set of voters XS as follows:
XS = {i ∈ N : Ai ⊆ S}.
We return no (i.e., W does not satisfy ℓ-PJR) if |XS | ≥ ℓ
n
k
, | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ ℓ
but |W ∩(∪i∈XAi)| < ℓ. If we do not return no for any S, in that case we return
yes (i.e., W satisfies ℓ-PJR).
We now argue that it takes at most O(2mm3n) operations to test PJR.
To check ℓ-PJR, we go through 2m sets. For each set S, we find XS which
takes m2n steps. After that we find ∪i∈XAi which takes an additional mn
operations. Hence it takes O(2mm2n) operations to test ℓ-PJR and it takes
O(2mm3n) operations to test PJR.
If a = maxi∈N |Ai| is bounded, then PJR can be tested in polynomial time.
Theorem 4. If a is bounded, testing PJR is solvable in polynomial time
O(ma+1m2n).
Proof. Suppose we want to check whether W ⊂ C satisfies PJR. Note that it
is sufficient to show that testing ℓ-PJR is polynomial-time solvable for each ℓ if
a is bounded. Note that we only need to consider ℓ ≤ a because the maximum
size of intersection of any set of approval sets is at most a which means that
| ∩i∈X Ai| ≤ a. For ℓ larger than a, ℓ-PJR is trivially satisfied.
We now describe the algorithm to test ℓ-PJR for all ℓ ≤ a. We go through
all the subsets S ∈ 2C of size ℓ ≤ a. There are at most
(
m
ℓ
)
= m!(m−ℓ)!(ℓ)! such
sets. Since ℓ ≤ a and a is bounded, it implies that a is constant as well and
hence there at most ma different subsets to be considered.
Each set S is viewed as the intersection of possible objecting /deviating set
of voters. For each S, we find the corresponding set of voters XS as follows:
XS = {i ∈ N : Ai ⊆ S}.
We return no (i.e., W does not satisfy ℓ-PJR) if |XS | ≥ ℓ
n
k
, | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ ℓ
but |W ∩(∪i∈XAi)| < ℓ. If we do not return no for any S, in that case we return
yes (i.e., W satisfies ℓ-PJR).
We now argue that it takes at most O(mam3n) operations to test PJR.
To check ℓ-PJR, we go through at most ma sets. For each set S, we find XS
which takes m2n steps. After that we find ∪i∈XAi which takes an additional
mn operations. Hence it takes O(mam2n) operations to test ℓ-PJR and it takes
O(ma+1m2n) operations to test PJR.
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Finally, we show that if d = maxc∈C |{i ∈ N : c ∈ Ai}| is bounded, then PJR
can be tested in polynomial time.
Theorem 5. If d is bounded, testing PJR is solvable in polynomial time
O(nddnm2).
Proof. Suppose we want to check whether W ⊂ C satisfies PJR. Note that for
any deviating/objecting set of voters X , | ∩i∈X Ai| ≤ d. The reason is that
any candidate c is approved by at most d voters. Hence in order to check for
a violation of ℓ-PJR, we just need to check for sets of voters of size at most d.
There are at most
(
n
d
)
≤ nd such set of voters. For each such coalition of voters,
we just need to check for ℓ-PJR for ℓ = 1, . . . , d/k. So ℓ ≤ d. For each X among
the at most nd sets of voters, we need to test for ℓ-PJR which requires us to
compute | ∩i∈X Ai|, |W ∩ (∪i∈XAi)|, and |X |. Hence testing ℓ-PJR of W takes
O(ndnm2) time and testing PJR takes time O(nddnm2).
In this paper, we examined the complexity of testing PJR, an interesting new
axiom in committee voting. The arguments for all of our positive algorithmic
results also hold for testing EJR rather than PJR. It will be interesting to see
whether testing PJR is FPT with respect to parameters a or d.
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